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LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, 
Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Btreets-Franchises.-In the absence of a provision to the con-
trary, a public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets 
subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein 
at its own expense when necessary to make way for proper 
governmental use of thc streets. 
[2] Id.-Fra.nchises.-The laying of sewers is a governmental as 
distinct from a proprietary function under the rule that a 
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject 
to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its 
own expense when necessary to make way for proper govern-
mental use; in this respect no distinction is made between 
sanitary sewers and storm drains or sewers. 
[3] Id.-Franchises.-The obligation of a public utility accepting 
franchise rights in public streets to relocate its facilities to 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Highwuys and Streets, §§ 2M, 205. 
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make way for the construction of storm drains by a county 
flood control district is not affected by the fact that the prin-
cipal purpose of the drains may be to drain the entire area 
served and not merely the streets thereof, since it would be 
impossible to provide drainage for the public streets without 
also draining the surrounding land, and the right of abutting 
owners to discharge surface waters onto the public streets is 
recognized as a customary use of streets. 
[4] Id.-Franchises.-The fact that a comprehensive 1100d control 
system requires construction of trunk drains that primarily 
service areas other than the streets under or across which they 
are located does not dect the character of the public use or 
limit the public's rights in the public streets, and hence does 
not affect a public utility's franchise obligations to relocate its 
facilities to make way for the construction of storm drains 
by a county flood control district. 
[6] IcL-Franchises.-A utility's franchise obligations in public 
streets rest on the paramount right of the people as a whole 
to use the public streets wherever located, and the fact that a 
franchise is granted by one political subdivision as an agent 
of the state does not defeat the right of another such agent 
acting in its governmental capacity to invoke the public right 
for the public benefit. 
[6] Wa.ters-Flood Oontrol Districts-Powers.-Under a statute 
expressly authorizing a county 1I0od control district to "eon-
struct, maintain and operate" storm drains, the district in 
doing so is exercising the police power of the state. 
[?] 8treeta-Franchises.-Wbere a public utility accepted its 
franchise rights in public streets subject to implied obligations 
to relocate its facilities at its own expense when necessary • 
to make way for proper governmental uses of the streets, there 
was no need for the .tate expressly to authorize a county 
lIood control district to impose such obligations, since the util-
ity had already assumed them. 
[8] IcL-Franchises.-A statutory amendment providing that noth-
ing in the statute shan be deemed to authorize a county flood 
control district to take, damage or destroy any property or to 
require the removal, relocation or alteration of any facility or 
structure unless just compensation therefor be first made "in 
the manner and to the utent required by the Constitution of 
the United States and the Constitution of California," cannot 
reasonably be interpreted to mcan that compensation is to be 
made in the manner and to the extent that would be required 
if the constitutional provisions required compensation; it 
clearly provides for compensation only as "required" by those 
•. [6] See Oal.lur., Waters, § 901; Am.lur.,Waters, § 98. 
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prOVISIOns, and constitutes legh:lutive recognition that the 
district is not obligated to pay for utility relocations unless 
constitutional provisions so require. 
[9] Id.-Franchises.-A franchise exercised by a county flood con· 
trol district in the public streets in its governmental capacity 
is not subordinate to a prior franchise granted a public utility. 
[10] Id.-Franchises.-Though the express terms of a statute de-
fine the obligation of a public utility to relocate its facilities 
at its own expense, this does not, by application of the maxim 
eg;p,.essio u"iu8 exclusio alterius est, exclude other similar 
obligations; the rule of strict construction of public grants in 
the public interest compels such conclusion where the provi-
sions relied on as excluding any implied obligations may 
reasonably be interpreted as no more than partial expressions 
of common-law rights and obligations inserted out of an 
abundance of caution or by way of example only, and where, 
had the statute referred only to removal, it might east doubt on 
the right to relocate instead when relocation would be sufficient 
to subserve the public interest; the enumeration of what were 
considered to be the most important of the utilities' obligations 
cannot reasonably be interpreted as an express direction of the 
Legislature passing the utilities' other obligations over to the 
taxpayers. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for declaratory relief against public utilities main-
taining facilities that must be relocated in the public streets 
to make way for construction of storm drains by plaintiff 
district, in which one defendant utility cross-complained to 
recover costs of certain relocations. Judgment for such defend-
ant, after a severance was granted as to it, reversed with 
directions. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Edward H. Gay-
lord, Deputy County Counsel, for Appellant. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Norman S. Sterry, Ira C. Powers 
and Martin E. Whelan, Jr., for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiif, Los Angeles County Flood Con-
trol District, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of 
defendant, Southern California Edison Company, in an action 
brought for declaratory relief against numerous public utili-
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ties maintaining facilities that mnst be relocated in the public 
streets to make way for the construction of storm drains by the 
district. Edison cross-complained to recover the costs of cer-
tain relocations and for declaratory relief with respect to 
others not included in the complaint. A severance was granted 
as. to Edison, and the only parties to the trial and this appeal 
are Edison and the district. 
The relocations involved are all located within various cities 
in the county of Los Angeles other than the city of Los 
Angeles. No question is presented as to the cost of relocating 
facilities in the unincorporated area of the county or within 
the city of Los Angeles. In the cities that are involved, 
Edison operates under various types of franchises; franchises 
granted pursuant to article XI, section 19 of the California 
Constitution as it existed before 1911, franchises granted by 
charter cities, franchises granted by both charter and non-
charter cities pursuant to the Franchise Act of 1937 (now 
Pub. Util. Code, §§ 6201-6302), and other franchises not 
granted under the 1937 Act but which Edison contends have 
the same legal effect for the purposes of this action. 
The district is engaged in a comprehensive flood control 
program involving among other things the construction of 
storm drains throughout its territory. It is conceded that 
Edison may properly be required to relocate its facilities in the 
public streets to make way for the construction of the drains. 
The sole issue is whether Edison or the district must bear 
the cost of such relocations. 
[1] In Southern Oalif. Gas 00. "Y. Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 
713, 716 [329 P.2d 289], we stated that "In the absence of a 
provision to the contrary it has generally been held that a 
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject 
to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its 
own expense when necessary to make way for a proper gov-
ernmental use of the streets. [Citations.] [2] The laying 
of sewers is a governmental as distinct from a proprietary 
function under the foregoing rule. [Citations.]" In this 
respect no distinction has been made between sanitary sewers 
and storm drains or sewers. (New Orleans Gaslight 00. v. 
Drainage Oom., 197 U.S. 453, 461-462 [25 8.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 
831] ; B. d': Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex reI. Gi'imwooc7, 200 U.S. 
561,691 [26 S.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596] ; see aho .~fafiel' of L. «; 
W. Orphan Home, 92 N.Y. 116, 119; Oity of ChlCirl1lati v. 
Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499, 508 [8 Am.Rep. 73] ; Stoudinger v. 
Oity of Newark, 28 N.J.Eq. 446, 448; Cummins v. City of 
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Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 [41 Am.Rep. 618, 625]; Scranton-
Pa.~cago1l1a Realty Co. v. City of Pascagoula, 157 MifolS. 498 
1128 So. 73, 74]; ](ilcy v. Bond, 114 Mich. 447 [72 N.W. 253, 
254].) 
[3] Edison contends, however, that the use of public 
streets for storm drains can only be considered a primary use 
of the streets when the principal purpose of the drains is to 
drain the streets themselves. When, as in this case, the prin-
cipal use of the drains will be to drain the entire areas served 
and drainage of the streets will be only incidental thereto, 
Edison contends that use for drainage is on a parity with its 
own use, and that therefore the district must pay for relocating 
Edison's preexisting facilities. We find no basis in the cases 
for the distinction Edison seeks to draw based on what may 
be the primary purpose of any particular drain. Thus in the 
New Orleans Gas Company case, the defendant's purpose 
was to provide drainage for the entire city and not merely 
the streets thereof. It would be manifestly impossible to 
provide drainage for the public streets without also draining 
the surrounding land, and the right of abutting owners to 
discharge surface waters onto the public streets is recognized 
as a customary use of the streets. (Portman v. Clementina 
Co., 147 Cal.App.2d 651, 659-660 [305 P.2d 963]; see also 
Kramer v. City of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 668, 674-676 [82 P. 
334].) [4] Moreover, the fact that a comprehensive :flood 
control system requires construction of trunk drains that pri-
marily service areas other than the streets under or across 
which they are located does not affect the character of the 
public use or limit the public's right in the public streets. 
Thus, in the Los Angeles Gas Company case, although the 
(lity's sewer served incidentally at most the county street 
under which it passed, we held that the company's franchise 
obligations were not affected. [5] c, Such obligations rest 
on the paramount right of the people as a whole to use the 
public streets wherever located, and the fact that a franchi",e 
is granted by one political subdivision as an agent of the state 
[citations], does not defeat the right of another such agent 
acting in its governmental capacity to invoke the public right 
for the public benefit. [Citations.] " (Southern Calif. Gas 
Co. v. Los Angeles, 50 Ca1.2d 713, 717 [329 P.2d 289].) 
Edison ('ontends that any obligation to relocate its facili-
ties at its own expense rests in the police power of the state 
and that the state has 110t delegated its police power in this 
respect to the district. It invokes the rule that grants of 
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power to municipal corporations are to be strictly construed 
and any doubts resolved against the existence of the power 
claimed. (See Harden v. Superior Oourt, 44 Ca1.2d 630, 641 
[284 P.2d 9], and cases cited.) [6] Section 2 of the Los 
Angeles County Flood Control Act expressly authorizes the 
district to "construct, maintain and operate," the drains here 
involved. (West's, Wat. Code-Appendix, § 28.2, 1 Deering's 
Wat. Code, Act 4463, § 2.) In doing so it is exercising the 
police power of the state. (House v. Los Angeles County Flood 
Oontrol Dist., 25 Ca1.2d 384, 392 [153 P.2d 950] ; O'Hara v. 
Los Angeles Oounty Flood etc. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 64 [119 
P.2d 23].) [7] By insisting that Edison is obligated to 
relocate its facilities at its own expense, the district is not 
seeking to exercise an implied authority to impose additional 
burdens upon Edison, but is relying on the claimed existence 
of obligations that arose when Edison accepted its various 
franchises. (See City of San Antonio v. San Antonio St. 
By. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App.l [39 S.W.136, 139] ; New Orleans 
Gaslight 00. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans, 111 
La. 838 [35 So. 929, 933], at'f'd, 197 U.S. 453 [25 S.Ct. 
471, 49 L.Ed. 831].) If, as the district contends, Edison 
accepted its franchise rights in public streets subject to 
implied obligations to relocate its facilities at its own expense 
when necessary to make way for proper governmental uses 
of the street, there was no need expressly to authorize the 
district to impose such obligations, for Edison had already as-
sumed them. 
[8] Edison contends, however, that the 1953 amendment to 
section 16 of the Los Angeles County Flood Control Act pro-
,videa for the payment of its relocation costs by the district. 
The amendment, which follows the act's enumeration of the 
powers of the board of supervisors of the district, states, "pro-
vided, however, that nothing in this act contained shall be 
deemed to authorize said district in exercising any of its 
powers to take, damage or destroy any property or to require 
the removal, relocation, alteration or destruction of any 
bridge, railroad, wire line, pipeline, facility or other structure 
unless just compensation therefor be first made, in the man-
ner and to the extent required by the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of California." (Stats. 
1953, ch. 1139, p. 2635, § 1.) This provision cannot reasonably 
be iuterpreted, as Edison contends, to mean that compensation 
is to be made in the manner and to the extent that would be 
required if the constitutional provisions required compensa-
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tion. It clearly provides for compensation only as "required" 
by those provisions. Had the Legislature intended that the 
district should go beyond constitutional requirements in mak-
ing compensation it is reasonable to assume that it would have 
adopted language similar to that found in many other flood 
control acts adopted before, after, and contemporaneously 
with the 1953 amendment. For example the Marin County 
Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act provides 
that the district shall "in addition to the damage for the 
taking, injury, or destruction of property, also pay the cost 
of removal, reconstruction or relocation of any structure, 
railways, mains, pipes, conduits, wires, cable, poles, of any 
public utility which is required to be moved to a new location . 
. . . " (Stats. 1953, ch. 666, p.1915, 1919; West, Water Code-
Appendix, § 68-5 (13); 1 Deering's Wat. Code, Act 4599, 
subd. 13.) It is true that if the amendment does no more 
than require compliance with the state and federal Oon-
stitutions, its enactment was unnecessary, and given the 
Legislature's awareness of the problem as evidenced by 
provisions of other flood control acts enacted at the aame 
session, it is at least dubious that by expressly reaffirming the 
district's constitutional obligations, it was intended by impli-
cation to negative others that might also exist. Had the Leg-
islature in 1953 clearly not wanted the district to pay reloea-
. tion expenses, it could have expressed this intent also more 
clearly than by merely reaffirming the district's constitu-
-tional obligations. Nevertheless, the fact remains that thc 
plain language of the 1953 amendment provides for payment 
only to the "extent required" by the constitutional provisions, 
. and if it is anything more than an admonition to obey the 
constitutions, it constitutes legislative recognition that the 
district is not obligated to pay for utility relocations unless 
constitutional provisions so require. 
[9] Edison contends that section 15 of the act grants the 
district a franchise to use the public streets and that there-
fore its rights therein are no greater than those of any other 
franchise holder and, accordingly, that the later user must 
bear the costs of relocating the earlier user's facilities. Es-
sentially the same contention was answered adversely to 
Edison's position in the Southern California Gas Company 
case where we held that a franchise exercised by a city in its 
governmental capacity is not subordinate to a prior franchise 
granted to a public utility. (Southern Calif. Gas Co. v. Los 
Angeles, 8upt"a, 50 Ca1.2d 713, 718-719.) 
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[10] Edison contends that the express terms of the Fran-
('hisc Act of 1937- define its obligation to relocate its facilities 
at its OW11 expcnsc and that as to franchises granted pursuant 
to that act any other similar obligations are excluded by clear 
implication. V-le rejected a similar contention based on the 
maxim expressio unius cxclusio alterius est in the Southern 
California Gas Company case, and although there are some 
differences between the franchise provisions involved, the rule 
of strict construction of public grants in the public inteTf'st 
(Knoxville Waiet· Co. v. KfI.()xvillc, 200 U.S. 22, 33-34 [26 
8.Ct. 224, 50 L.Ed. 353] ; City of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas If; 
Electric Co., 173 Cal. 787, 791 [161 P. 978] ; County of Los 
Angeles v. Southern Calif. Tel. Co., 32 Ca1.2d 378, 384 [196 
P.2d 773J; Civ. Code, § 1069) compels the same conclusion 
here. As in that case most of the provisions relied on as ex-
cluding any implied obligations may reasonably be interpreted 
as no more than partial expressions of common-law rights 
and obligations inserted out i)f an abundance of caution or by 
way of example only. It is true that section 6297 of the Public 
Utilities Code may go beyond a restatement of the common-
law rule by requiring the utility to remove rather than merely 
relocate its facilities to make way for public travel, but if 
it does so, a point we need not decide, it snpplies an additional 
reason why the maxim cxpressio 1lnius does not apply. Had 
the statute referred only to removal it might cast doubt on the 
right to relocate instead when relocation would be sufficient to 
subserve the public interest. There was thus a special reason 
for mentioning relocation for the specified purposes in section 
6297, and it may not therefore be inferred that relocation 
was included to exclude by implication obligations to relocate 
for other purposes. (City of Lexington v. Commercial Bank, 
130 Mo.App. 687 [108 S.W. 1095, 1096J.) In short, here as 
in the Los Angeles Gas Company case, the enumeration of 
·"The grantee of a franchise under this chapter shall construct, install, 
lind maintain all pipes, conduits, poles, wires, and appurtenances in 
accordance snd in conformity ... -ith all of the ordinances and rules 
adopted by the legislative body of the municipality in the exercise of its 
i police powers and not in conflict with the paramount autllOrity of tho 
State, and, as to stnte highways, lIubject to the laws relating to the 
location and maintenance of wch facilities therein." (Pub. Util. Code, 
§ 6294.) 
"The grantee sllall remOTe or relocate without expeDl~e to the muniei. 
113lity any facilities install{'d, usted, and nJ:l.illt:lrnt>d under the franchiHo 
if and wIlen made necessary l.y ony lawful rl,ange of gra<1e, alignment, 
or width of allY pul>lic strt'ct, way, nlley, or ))Iace, including the COD-
strudure of any subway or "iaduct, by tIle Dlunicipality." (Pub. Uti!. 
Code, t 6297.) 
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what were considererl to be the most important of the utilitics' 
obligations cannot rcasonably be interpreted as au "express 
direction of the Legislatnre" passing thc utilities' other eom-
mon-law obligations over to the taxpayer. (Transit Comm1:s-
sion v. Long Island R. Co., 253 N.Y. 345 [171 N.E. 565, 568] ; 
New Y07'k City Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison Co., 
295 N.Y. 467 [68 N.E.2d 445, 448-449]; St. Helena v. Sail 
Francisco etc. By., 24 Cal.App. 71, 78 [140 P. 600, 605]; 
County Court v. White, 79 W.Va. 475 [91 S.E. 350, 352, 
IJ.R.A. 1917D 660] ; Peoples Gas MUllt &'; Coke Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 413 Ill. 457 [109 N.E.2d 777, 787]; Nicholas Di 
Menna &- Sons v. City of New York, 114 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350.) 
No contention is made that the provisions of any of the 
franchises granted to Edison other than pursuant to the 1937 
Aet are more favorable to its position than those considered 
above, and accordingly it is unnecessary to consider such 
other franchises separately. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to enter judgment for the district declaring its rights in ac-
cord with the views herein expressed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
McComb, J., dissented. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion in the case at bar is another link in 
the chain of confusion which exists in the opinions of this court 
which involves the exercise of the police power and the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain. I pointed out in my 
concurring opinion in Southern CaUf. Gas Co. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 50 Ca1.2d 713 [329 P.2d 289], that cases in which 
the right of eminent domain was involved are cited as author-
ity in cases involving the exercise of the police power and 
police power cases are cited in support of cases involving the 
eminent domain power. . 
I am unable to understand on just what theory the majority 
relies in the case under consideration. It appears that it must 
be the police power given to the flood control district by the 
majority of this court which is the basis for its holding that 
the Edison Company must relocate its facilities at its own 
expense. 
It has long been a rule of law in this state that political 
subdivisions such as drainage districts, irrigation districts, 
) 
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and the like, are entities of limited powers-those which have 
been expressly granted them by the Legislature. (StimsOfl. v. 
Alessandro lrr. Dist., 135 Cal. 389, 392, 393 [67 P. 496, 1034] ; 
City 0/ Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306, 310-312 [184 P. 397] ; 
Leeman v. Perris Irrigation Dist., 140 Cal. 540, 543 [74 P. 
24] ; -Bottoms v. Madera Irr. Dist., 74 Cal.App. 681, 694, 695 
[242 P. 100] ; Harden v. Superior C01trt, 44 Cal.2d 630, 642 
[284 P.2d 9].) The only qualification to this rule is that cer-
tain powers strictly necessary to carry out those expressly 
granted by the Legislature are implied. 
The Los Angeles County Flood Control District was created 
by the Legislature in 1915 (Stats. 1915, ch. 755, p. 1052-1512, 
§§ 1-23 inclusive). The act is now found in Deering's Water 
Code as Act 4463, sections 1-23 inclusive, pages 325-354. 
Section 2 sets forth the objectives of the act as providing 
for the control and conservation of the flood, storm and other 
waste waters of the district "and to conserve such waters 
for beneficial and useful purposes by spreading, storing, re-
taining or causing to percolate into the soil within said district, 
or to save or conserve in any manner, all or any of such, 
waters, and to protect from damage from such flood or storm 
waters, the harbors, waterways, public highways and prop-
erty of said district. " The same section then provides: •• Said 
Los Angeles County Flood Control District is hereby de-
clared to be a body corporate and politic, and as IUCh .haU 
have power: • • • 
4'1. To have perpetual succession. 
"2. To sue and be sued ••• 
u 3. To adopt a seal • • .;_ 
"4. To take by grant, purebase, gift, devise or lease ••• 1 
real or personal property of every tind within or without 
the district necessary to the full exercise of its power. 
"5. To acquire or contract to acquire lands, rights of way, 
easements, privileges and property of every kind, and con-
struct, maintain and operate any and all works or improve. 
ments •. '1
"6. To Mve and ezerci8e the right of eminent domain,: 
and in the manner prot1ided by law for the condemnation of, 
private property for public use, to take any property "eces.: 
.ary to carry out any of the objects or purposes of this act, I 
whether such property be already devoted to the same use' 
by any district or other public corporation or agency or: 
otherwise, and may condemn any existing works or improve-! 
ments in said district now used to control flood or storm' 
I 
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'waters, or to conserve such flood or storm waters or to pro-
tect any property in said district from damage from such 
flood or storm waters." (Emphasis added.) 
Subsection 7 provides for the incurment of debt and the 
issuance of bonds; subsection 7a provides for the borrowing of 
federal funds; subsection 7b provides for the sale of bonds to 
the county; subsection 8 provides for the collection of taxes; 
flubsection 9 provides for the making of contracts; subsection 
10 provides for the granting of easements; subsection 11 pro-
vides for the disposal of rubbish; subsection 12 provides for 
. the payment of bond premiums; subsection 13 provides for 
the disposal of property. The subsections to section 2 as just 
set forth provide all the powers granted to the district by 
the Legislature. It is apparent that the district is not granted 
the right to exercise the state's police power. 
Article I, section 14, of the California Constitution pro-
vides, in part, that "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation having 
first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner ..•. " 
This refers to the right of eminent domain. 
In 1953, section 16 of Act 4463 was amended to provide 
for certain powers in the board of supervisors in the exercise 
of the district's right of eminent domain. The amendment 
provides, in part, as follows: "[P]rovided, however, that 
'lothing in this act contained shall be deemed to autkoNe 
said district in exercising any of its powers 10 take, damage 
or destroy any property or to require the removal, relocation, 
alteration Of' destruction of any bridge, railroad, tDireline, 
pipeline, facility or other structure unless just compensation 
therefor be first made, in the manner and to the extent re-
quired by the Constitution of the United States and the Con-
stitution of California." (Emphasis added.) 
In my opinion, the Legislature of this state could not have 
more clearly expressed its meaning: That the relocation of 
Bny facility was an exercise by the district of its power of 
eminent domain and that compensation should be made there-
for as provided in the California Constitution, article I, sec-
tion 14. 
The reasoning fonnd in thc majority opinion on the mean-
ing and etit'et of the 1953 amendment heretofore set forth, 
whilc extremely amhiguous and a masterpiece of confusion, 
apparently means that since the Constitution of California 
docs not spell out in words of one syllable that relocations of 
,variolls types of facilities arc to be compensated in money, the 
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IJegislature did not really mean what it said-that it in-
tended just compensation to be made for such relocations. 
It is first argued in the majority opinion that if the amend-
ment only required the district to abide by its constitutional 
obligations, the amendment was unnecessary; and then that 
it was "dubious" that the Legislature intended by implication 
to negative "others" (probably constitutional obligations) 
that "might also exist." Then the following unclear language 
appears: "Had the Legislature in 1953 clearly not wanted the 
district to pay relocation expenses, it could have expressed 
this intent also more clearly than by merely reaffirming the 
district's constitutional obligations. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that the plain language of the 1953 amendment pro-
vides for payment only t~ the • extent required' by the con-
stitutional provisions, and if it is anything more than an 
admonition to obey the constitutions, it constitutes legislative 
recognition that the district is not obligated to pay for utility 
relocations unless constitutional provisions so require." When 
the Legislature clearly states that compensation is to be m.ade 
for relocatwns how is it possible for the m.ajority to assume 
that the Legisla.turc clea"'ly did not want the district to pay 
for such relocations' The entire section (16) deals with the 
district's right of eminent domain and the supervisors' duties 
and powers in connection therewith. The Constitutions pro-
vide that private property shall not be taken or damaged 
without just compensation being made therefor. There is no 
reason whatsoever for the nebulous reasoning and negative 
thinking set forth in the majority opinion. 
If we assume that the theory on which the conclusion 
reached by the majority is that the district is exercising thc 
police power of the state, a complete answer is that the district 
has no police power. In the majority opinion is the following 
Rtatement: "Section 2 of the Los Angeles County Flood Con-
trol Act expressly authorizes the district to 'constrnct, main-
tRill, and operate,' the drains here inyoly('d (West's, Wat<~l' 
Code-Appendix, § 28-2.) In doing so it is exercising the 
police power of the state. (House v. Los Angeles County 
Flood Control Disf., 25 Ca1.2d 384, 392 [153 P.2d 950]; 
O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d 
61,64 rU9 P.2tl 23).)" In cOlJstructillg, l1lUilltail1illg and 
operatillg the draills Ilf'rt' iuvolVt'd tIle district was t'xerei:,;ilJg 
a power expressly granted to it by the Legislature of this 
state. It is true that the grant of the power was given by 
the state as an exercise of the stale's police power but that is 
Dec.'1958] L.A. COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DIST. ,11. !J43 
SOUTHERN CA L. EDJ~ON CO. 
(51 C.2d 3311 333 P.IIS 1J 
Dot to say that in the delegation of the powers $pecifically 
enuDlcrated iu the a('t cr('ating thc district the Legislature 
also granted to the district the state's police power in other 
respects. In the House case this court reversed a judgment 
of dismissal entered after the trial court had sustained a de-
murrer to the plaintiff's complaint for damages to her property 
occasioned by the district's negligence in planning, construc-
tion and maintenance of certain flood control channel work. 
We noted that the plaintiff "rests her right of recovery upon 
article I, section 14, of the state Constitution, which provides 
that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation to the owner. The trial court 
erred in la~11:ng to sustain the constitutional basis 01 the plain-
tif/'s claim under the disU,lguisha'ble concept of her plead-
ing. " (House v. Los AlIgeles Oounty Flood Oontrol Dist., 
;25 Ca1.2d 384, 386 [153 P.2d 950]; emphasis added.) While 
:the court spoke of the poli('e power the case was not decided 
upon the theory that tbe flood control district was exercising 
the police power of the state. It was said: "While the police 
'power is very broad in concept, it is not without restriction 
in relation to thc taking 01' damaging of property. When it 
passes beyond proper bounds in its invasion of property 
rights, it in effect comes within the purview of the law of 
eminent domain and its exercise requires compensation . 
. [Citations.] In fact, on the point of a governmental agency's 
·liability for damages arising in connection with its under-
taking construction work, the prevailing opinion in the Archer 
ease [Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [119 P.2d 
:1]] $upra, does not purport to dispute the settled principle 
that public necessity limits the right to exact uncompensated 
submission from the property owner if his property be either 
damaged, taken or destroyed. Rather it is expressly stated 
there in the prevailing opinion (19 Ca1.2d 23-24) : 'The state 
or its subdivisions may take or damage private property with-
out compensation if such action is essent1'aZ to safeguard public 
health, safety or morals. [Citing autllOrities.] In certain 
circ1tmsta1tCl'.'1, 11Ol/'ct'er, the taking or d{1magiflg of private 
propc,·ty lor such a p1,rposc is not prompted 'by so great a 
'leees,'1ity as to be jlfstified 1vithotlt propcr compensation to 
the owner. [Citing antllOrities.]' (Italics aclded.) Thus 
there is recognized the incontestable proposit.ion that the 
exercise of the police power, though an essent.ial attribute of 
sovereignty for the public welfare and arbitrary in itc; nature, 
(·annot. extend b~yond tIle necessities of the case and be made a 
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cloak to dellt.roy conRtitutionaJ rights m; to thp. inviolateness of 
private property." (Pp. 388, 389.) The House case, with 
its reliance upon the Archer case, demonstrates again the con-
fusion which exists in the cases. The House case involved an , 
action against the flood control district. The Archer case in-
volved an action against the city of Los Angeles. Article 
XI, section 11, of the California Constitution provides that 
"Any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce 
within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." This is 
known as the constitutional police power provision. It does 
not provide that any flood control, or sanitary, or mosquito 
abatement district may exercise the police power of the state. 
O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d 61 
[119 P.2d 23], also relied upon by the majority for its state-
ment that the district was exercising the "police power" 
of the state was decided upon the theory that a lower riparian 
owner has no redress for injury to his land caused by improve-
ments in the stream when there has been no diversion of water 
out of its natural channel. The following statement is found 
in the majority opinion in the 0 'Hara case: "Compensation 
for private property taken or damaged for a public use must 
be made under article I, section 14, only when the taking or 
damaging of property is not so essential to the public health, 
safety, and morals as to be justified under the 'police power,' 
and the injury is one which would give rise to a cause of action 
on the part of the owner if it were inflicted by a private per-
son. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, ante, p. 19 [119 P.2d 1], 
this day decided.)" Again, it will be noted, that while the 
flood control district was involved, the Archer case, which 
involved the city, was cited as authority. While the city of 
Los Angeles may, by eonstitutional authority, exercise both 
the police power and the power of eminent domain, a flood 
control district has only the authority and powers specifically 
delegated to it by the Legislature. In this particular instance 
the flood control district of Los Angeles County may exercise 
only the power of eminent domain and, by reason of the 1953 
amendment to the act as heretofore set forth, the required 
relocation of certain enumerated facilities by the district is 
considered by the Legislature to be an exercise of its power of 
eminent domain and the owner of the facility must be com-
pensated for such relocation. It is only where the state, or 
one 0/ its political subdivisions having thc right to exe,.ci.~e 
the police power, is involyed tIlat the so-called "twilight zone" 
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('omes into play and the heretofore quoted language from the 
Archer case is pertinent. In the case at bar, as in the House 
and 0 'Hara eases, a political subdivision, the Los Angeles 
Flood Control District, is involved and it is emphatically 
pointed out that the Los Angeles Flood Control District has 
)10 right to exercise the police power of the state inasmuch as 
the Legisiature has not seen fit to so authorize it in the act 
which created it and the amendments thereto. 
The 1953 amendment to the act was not an "unnecessary" 
legislative act as intimated in the majority opinion. The pur-
pose thereof was to make certain that a required relocation 
of certain facilities by the district was part of its eminent 
domain power. While the language therein specifically re-
(luiring compensation to be paid therefor might be considered 
unnecessary in view of the constitutional requirement that 
just compensation be paid for the taking of private property, 
under the reasoning of the majority it was obviously. neees-
sary--even if, under the holding here, quite futile. 
I recently prepared a concurring opinion upholding the 
right of the city of Los Angeles to require a utility company 
to relocate its facilities without compensation to make way 
for a sewer line which the city was installing in a public 
street or road (Southern Calif. OM Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 
50 Cal.2d 713 [329 P.2d 289)). In said opinion I stated that 
under the authorities the city was performing a governmental 
function and was exercising the police power granted to it by 
the Constitution of this state. It should be perfectly ,clear 
from that opinion that the rule announced in the majority 
opinion there cannot be relied upon in support of the position 
of the plaintiff here, as neither the Constitution nor the 
I>tatutes of this state purport to give the plaintiff any of the 
power exercised by the city in that case. 
In my opinion the judgment of the trial court in favor 
of defendant Rnd cross-complainant, Southern California 
Edison Company, should be affirmed. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I am in accord with the prin-
ciples of law discussed by Mr. Justice Carter and concur in 
his conclusion that the judgment of the trial court in favor 
of Southern Califomia Edison Company should be affirmed. 
]~t'SJ>Olllh'llt 's lletitioll for a rehearjng was denied January 
14, 1959. Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
